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Emerging Challenges in Asset Protection 
Planning 
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Asset protection planning has gained in popularity and 
acceptance among estate planners over the past two decades, 
and is now a headline topic at national legal conferences and a 
featured subject in law school curricula.  While the self-settled 
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spendthrift trust was once considered the domain of a handful of 
offshore jurisdictions, sixteen American states have now enacted 
legislation to facilitate such planning closer to home.   
This article examines the historical challenges and 
contemporary threats to asset protection planning, including:  
Past use of the contempt powers of the courts to compel debtors 
to repatriate assets held offshore; tort liability for civil 
conspiracy and civil RICO claims; attorney liability and ethical 
considerations; and the distinction between “fraudulent 
transfers” and “fraud.” Recent cases point to the emergence of 
a new doctrine – the per se fraudulent transfer rule – affecting 
asset protection planning even in those states that recognize self-
settled spendthrift trusts.  Transitioning away from asset 
protection trusts to more modern, cutting-edge techniques –
including captive insurance and LLCs – enable lawyers to offer 
a broader spectrum of solutions and better secure client assets 
from creditor threat. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND UNANTICIPATED POLICY 
ARGUMENTS 
Society instinctively fears what it does not understand. Asset 
protection is tinted with adverse connotations and fears of the unknown. 
Asset protection planning could be likened to tax planning: A field 
fraught with its own perks and pitfalls. Like tax planning that follows the 
guidelines of available tax authorities, asset protection planning that 
abides by the governing authorities on fraudulent transfers generally 
works. By contrast, antagonistic asset protection planning may be 
compared to antagonistic tax planning, which is likely to land both the 
client and the attorney in hot water. 
Popular media, combined with the outcomes of a handful of cases 
featuring notoriously bad facts,1 feed a fallacy that needs to be 
elucidated: Asset protection remains a legitimate and requisite device in 
individual estate planning when conducted within the boundaries of the 
law. Affirming this viewpoint, 16 states2 have enacted domestic asset 
protection trust (“DAPT”) laws to enhance certainty in this particular 
area of planning.3 
This article reexamines historical challenges to asset protection 
planning and concludes that the emerging trend does not look auspicious 
for straightforward asset protection. If the primary reasoning for the 
structure is to achieve asset protection benefits, states like California will 
likely find the structure to be a per se fraudulent transfer. Even in those 
states that do not follow the California rule, courts are inclined to 
disfavor a structure created for asset protection reasons. One should look 
                                                                                                             
1 See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Affordable Media, LLC 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 
1999) (where the Andersons ran a Ponzi scheme through their late-night telemarketing 
business and placed the money into a Cook Islands trust which was later challenged by 
the FTC). 
2 Hawaii, Nevada, Missouri, New Hampshire, Alaska, Delaware, Oklahoma, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, Utah, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wyoming, West Virginia and 
Mississippi. 7th Annual Domestic Asset Protection Trust State Rankings Chart, http://osh
ins.com/images/DAPT_Rankings.pdf. 
3 State-approved DAPT laws override common United States public policy, as it was 
explained in the Restatement, and allow a settlor to form a trust benefitting himself to 
afford him with protection from future creditors. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 156(2) (1959). 
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ahead by considering the rationale of the ruling in Kilker v. Stillman4 and 
the Section 548(e)(1) clawback rule of the Bankruptcy Code; these are 
the early warning signs as to what may come to be a majority approach 
in the future.5 
“[E]ffective people are not problem-minded; they’re opportunity-
minded. They feed opportunities and starve problems. They think 
preventively.”6 Attorneys seeking to push back against this trend may 
have to look outside the traditional planning models of asset protection 
trusts and consider other approaches that do not signify an inherent asset 
protection motive. Captive insurance offers perhaps the most effective 
way for an operating business to realize profits inside an asset protective 
structure, while facilitating important estate planning goals at the same 
time. LLCs and foreign investment funds also offer a variety of indirect 
asset protection benefits while serving primarily business objectives. 
This article seeks to consider the less publicized and yet to be 
articulated arguments in favor of asset protection planning. From a social 
policy standpoint, one may argue that, by deterring attorneys and clients 
from engaging in asset protection planning, the United States legal 
system emboldens economic waste. Spending one’s money and 
becoming a debtor entails little consequence, whereas those who choose 
to preserve wealth through an asset protection trust face potential liability 
for years afterward. 
From an economic standpoint, discouraging wealth preservation 
reflexively incites imprudent lending, conceivably leading to another 
market bubble. The last recession revealed the awesome scope of greedy 
creditors and slippery lenders who offered zero-down financing and “no 
document” mortgages to those with insufficient credit. Yet, when the 
bubble burst, creditors leaned on a legal bias built into the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) and state court judges, who 
instinctively side with creditors at the expense of debtors. The UFTA, a 
set of uniform fraudulent transfer laws enacted in almost every state, 
provides a defined set of legal remedies to creditors. Among other things, 
a creditor may ask a court to set aside a fraudulent transfer under the 
UFTA, awarding the transferred property to the creditor instead of the 
debtor. 
Moreover, the debtor historically has had a choice between 
preserving wealth and spending it, and public policy should not 
discourage the frugal in favor of the reckless. An individual should be 
allowed to spend his after-tax money notwithstanding the remote 
                                                                                                             
4 Kilker v. Stillman, 2012 WL 5902348 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012) (unpublished). 
5 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(e)(1) (2012). 
6 STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE 7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE: RESTORING THE 
CHARACTER ETHIC 154 (2004) (paraphrasing Peter Drucker). 
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possibility that one day a future creditor might come calling. Individuals 
should not be expected to compromise their estate plans and leave their 
life savings forever exposed to satisfy the claims of unknown and 
unanticipated creditors. Individuals who responsibly insure their home, 
automobiles, health, and wealth should not be any less worthy of legal 
protection than those who spend their earnings into oblivion. 
The bias in the legal system, which favors creditors, creates a moral 
hazard in which creditors are immunized from their own poor decisions. 
It denies the lending industry the opportunity to learn from experience. 
Instead of requiring the creditor to bear the costs of bad loan decisions, 
policy judgments underlying the UFTA and state court rulings on 
fraudulent transfers instead shift the costs of credit to the community at 
large through clogged court dockets. Taxpayers are forced to incur, 
among other things, the high cost of incarcerating debtors, even though 
such incarcerations are blatantly illegal, because creditors hoodwink state 
court judges into thinking that contempt of court is a legitimate means to 
compel payment of a debt. 
Social responsibility is likewise harmed by penalizing risk-averse 
behavior such as asset protection planning for those who seek to preserve 
their wealth when no liabilities are present or foreseeable. The layered 
complexity surrounding asset protection cannot be easily covered in a 
single article. However, this article will attempt to tackle the emerging 
issues through “simplicity without reduction”7 and offer the 
unanticipated and less often publicized arguments in light of recent cases 
that seek to curb asset protection planning. 
A. Asset Protection Defined 
“Asset protection,” first and foremost, serves to preserve wealth by 
erecting barriers between a creditor and one’s assets. Asset protection 
planning advances on the basis of two guiding principles: First, the 
manner in which assets are titled generally defines the scope of creditor 
remedies and judicial discourse governing claims to such assets;8 second, 
a creditor entitled to collect on a judgment may only reach those assets in 
existence at the time of collection – the creditor cannot reach back in 
time to attach assets that are no longer owned by the debtor. 
                                                                                                             
7 Göran Broman, John Holmberg & Karl-Henrik Roboèrt, Simplicity Without 
Reduction: Thinking Upstream Towards the Sustainable Society, 30 INTERFACES. 15 
(2000) (stating “[A]nalysis begins at a level where complexity is naturally low, rather 
 than at a level of detail where links to the principles of the system can be vague 
 and difficult to discern. We use the simplicity-without-reduction method out of  respect 
for complexity, in contrast to the common method of ignoring parts of reality to 
(seemingly) reduce complexity.”). 
8 BARRY S. ENGEL, ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING GUIDE 115-125.06 (3rd ed. 2013). 
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Traditional asset protection planning first looks to utilize the 
exemptions and protections available under domestic law, such as 
homestead, ownership by entirety, and retirement accounts.9 After 
exhausting all available exemptions, asset protection seeks to protect the 
remaining assets by utilizing legal structures that typically entail the 
severing of legal ownership from beneficial ownership.10 Asset 
protection planning is consistent with the freedom to dispose of one’s 
property as one wishes, which is deeply rooted in American history and 
law.11 For example, “New York law recognizes the right of individuals to 
arrange their affairs so as to limit their liability to creditors . . . .”12 This 
is also consistent with Judge Learned Hand’s renowned view that every 
person has the right to organize his endeavors to decrease his taxes.13 
Asset protection, especially when accomplished offshore, has been 
equated with “hiding assets” and “immoral” or “illegal” activity.14 
Contrary to popular perception, however, asset protection planning tends 
to be a fairly transparent process, due in no small part to provisions 
requiring that ownership of foreign trusts, business entities, and bank 
                                                                                                             
9 Id. at 155. 
10 Id. 
11 “All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable 
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking 
and obtaining their safety and happiness.” Mass. CONST. art. 1; see also FRANKLIN B. 
HOUGH, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: COMPRISING THE CONSTITUTION OF EACH STATE IN 
THE UNION, AND OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; EACH ACCOMPANIED BY A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND 
NOTES, TOGETHER WITH A CLASSIFIED ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS, ACCORDING TO 
THEIR SUBJECTS, SHOWING, BY COMPARATIVE ARRANGEMENT, EVERY CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISION NOW IN FORCE IN THE SEVERAL STATES; WITH REFERENCES TO JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS, AND AN ANALYTICAL INDEX. ILLUSTRATED BY CAREFULLY ENGRAVED FAC-
SIMILES OF THE GREAT SEALS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF EACH STATE AND 
TERRITORY 576 (2d vol. 1872). 
12 In re Joseph Heller Inter Vivos Trust, 161 Misc. 2d 369, 370 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1994); 
see e.g. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1988) (noting 
that Florida recognizes the homestead exemption to preserve wealth); see also First Nat’l 
Bank of Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1971) (noting that 
Florida recognizes asset protection when real estate is owned as tenants by the entirety). 
13 “Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging 
one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all 
do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are 
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals 
is mere cant.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d 
Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting). 
14 See Engel, supra note 8 at 176.02-175.03. 
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accounts be reported to the IRS on an annual basis.15 In reality, modern 
asset protection planning is not about hiding assets; it is a foreseeable 
response to a liberal legal system that entertains frivolous litigation as 
much as it is an unanticipated reaction to irresponsible creditors who 
imprudently lend funds to unqualified borrowers on an insufficiently 
collateralized basis. 
When properly implemented, asset protection planning enhances 
one’s ability to fend off claims.16 In this sense, one may analogize asset 
protection with an indispensable form of insurance for one’s wealth, with 
a deductible measured by the settlement value of the creditor’s claim. 
Thus, those who are risk-averse and seek to preserve their wealth may 
stand the greatest chance of benefiting from asset protection planning, as 
if obtaining a liability insurance policy. 
B. Asset Protection Using Trusts 
Asset protection planning is synonymous with the use of trusts. The 
underlying purpose of a trust is to give someone else—a trustee—assets 
to be held for the benefit of others. A self-settled spendthrift trust is the 
prevailing solution where a settlor, the owner of the assets, transfers legal 
ownership to a trustee but still enjoys the benefit of the assets.17 Notably, 
a self-settled spendthrift trust is a trust in which the settlor is also the 
beneficiary under a spendthrift clause.18 Historically, state courts have 
not permitted settlors to place their assets beyond the reach of creditors 
and enjoy the protection of a spendthrift clause, considering the self-
settled spendthrift trust to be void against public policy.19 The only trusts 
that were recognized were traditional trusts, where the beneficiary and 
settlor were not the same person.20 Traditionally, the use of a trust 
allowed individuals to avoid probate and prevent direct access to the 
assets by beneficiaries. 21 Due to the enactment of recent laws in DAPT 
                                                                                                             
15 Laura Sanders, Offshore Accounts: No Place to Hide?, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873248077045790
85511331606786. 
16 See Engel, supra note 8 at 135-145. 
17 Id. at 901.03. 
18 BNA Portfolio 810-3rd, Asset Protection Planning, pp. A-51. 
19 Id. at 901.04. 
20 Id. 
21 See generally STEPHEN J. CHOI, THE UNFOUNDED FEAR OF REGULATION S: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE ON OFFSHORE SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 50 DUKE L. J. 663, 665 (2000).; A well-
known historian, who focused on the study of English law, has notably said: “The idea of 
a trust is so familiar to us all that we never wonder at it. And yet surely we ought to 
wonder.” Id. In England, during the Middle Ages, landowners devised the “use,” a 
planning device that evolved with time into present-day trusts. Id. The donor was named 
a “feoffee to uses,” and the intended beneficiary of the use was named a “cestui que use.” 
Id. The beneficiary was allowed to take the profits and to convey per the instructions of 
142 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:135 
states and offshore jurisdictions, a settlor now can establish a self-settling 
spendthrift trust, name himself a beneficiary, and achieve wealth 
preservation. Most offshore jurisdictions and DAPT states acknowledge 
the necessity of having a spendthrift clause that would disallow the 
beneficiaries under duress from any future creditor re-assigning their 
interest.22 
Attorney, first began to create self-settled spendthrift trusts as an 
asset protection device by seeking out jurisdictions where transfers in 
trust were likely to be shielded from creditor claims. The Isle of Man 
became a focal point for this type of planning after the 1859 ruling 
in Corlett v. Radcliffe, where the court found that fraudulent transfer 
claims must be handled with an ad hoc approach.23 There, the Manx 
court upheld the trust where the settlor was solvent at the time the trust 
was funded and declined to set aside transfers in trust as fraudulent 
against future unanticipated creditors.24 This principle was reinforced 
over 100 years later in In re Heginbotham, a 1999 decision sustaining 
transfers by a solvent settlor to a trust; at the time of trust funding, there 
were no reasonably foreseeable creditors, even though the settlor 
subsequently became insolvent.25 As Winston Churchill stated “[T]he 
farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.”26 
                                                                                                             
the feoffee. Id. Henry VII ratified the statute of uses to offset the adverse revenue 
consequences incurred by the popularity of the use, attaching ownership of legal title to 
the beneficiaries of the use to hold them liable for taxes. Id. Yet, the statute of uses 
provided some exceptions from taxation, such as where an feoffee held some form of 
ownership in “active trust,” which led to the formation of the modern-day English trust. 
Id. Generations later, the United States Supreme Court equated the use and trust. Id. 
22 Engel, supra note 8 at 915.01. 
23 See Corlette v. Radcliffe, 14 Moo PCC 121, 15 ER 251 (1859) (Isle of Man). 
24 Id. 
25 Re The Petition Of Christopher Jollian Heginbotham, 2 ITELR 95 (1999) (Isle of 
Man). 
26 Margaret Brown, Lost in Abbreviated History, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION (Aug. 7, 
2014), http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/comment/letters/lost-in-abbreviated-histor
y/2015018.article. 
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Indeed, several countries27 have enacted trust laws meant to codify 
certain common law principles originating from the Isle of Man.28 
Some countries have also enacted additional provisions to deter 
creditors and offer more protection for trusts registered in their particular 
jurisdictions.29 For example, Belize offers immediate protection for 
transfers in trust, eliminating the applicability of fraudulent transfer law 
altogether.30 Belize eliminated the concept of “badges of fraud” and any 
evaluation of the intent behind transfers in trust after consulting attorneys 
in England and the United States during the drafting of its asset 
protection laws.31 Fraudulent transfer claims are disallowed against a 
Belize trustee, thus offering the ultimate asset protection. 
Consequentially, an irrevocable offshore trust is perhaps the most 
effective vehicle that affords ultimate asset protection: the owner 
irreversibly and permanently transfers the legal ownership of the assets 
to a trust and, after naming himself a beneficiary, as in a self-settling 
spendthrift trust, is able to enjoy the use of the property or assets under 
the supervision and discretion of a trustee, preferably residing in a 
foreign jurisdiction.32 
C. Codification of Modern Asset Protection Trust Law 
Following the success of offshore asset protection trusts, sixteen 
DAPT states33 have enacted laws permitting and recognizing some form 
of self-settled spendthrift trust.34 An extensive list of assets can be 
preserved via asset protection planning, including business interests, a 
professional practice, stocks, cash, real property, and most other forms of 
wealth. Non-DAPT states still permit creditors to reach assets of a self-
settled spendthrift trust to fulfill judgments against the settlor “on the 
basis that the ‘door to trust assets’ remains open as a self-settled 
                                                                                                             
27 The Cook Islands passed laws codifying asset protection in 1989 to its International 
Trusts Act. Highlights of the law include recognition of self-settled spendthrift trusts, a 
shortened statute of limitations for fraudulent transfers, and a requirement that the credit 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the debtor acted with the requisite intent to 
establish a fraudulent transfer. In 1992, Belize enacted asset protection trust laws utilizing 
a slightly-different approach. In 1996, Nevis followed the Cook Islands and Belize by 
enacting its own asset protection law. Its laws duplicated to a large extent the laws 
enacted by the Cook Islands. Nevis legislation added another protective layer by 
requiring that a creditor post a bond of approximately USD 13,000 to file a complaint 
against a Nevis trustee. See BELIZE TRUSTS ACT, ch. 202 (2000). 
28 See, e.g., Cook Islands, Belize, and Nevis. 
29 See generally BELIZE TRUSTS ACT, ch. 202 (2000). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Engel, supra note 8 at 1020.01.  
33 Supra note 2. 
34 Engel, supra note 8 at 945. 
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spendthrift trust; a judgment creditor would not need to [revert] the 
parties to their original position.”35 In non-DAPT states, if a settlor 
assigns a beneficiary other than himself, such a spendthrift trust would be 
afforded protection from creditors unlike a self-settled spendthrift trust, 
where the settlor and beneficiary are the same individual.36 However, as 
seen in Castellano, the creditors of a beneficiary, which are not the same 
as the settlor, may still be able to reach the assets of even a traditional 
spendthrift trust.37 
Until now, the absence of case law affirming the viability of 
domestic asset protection trusts have led most attorneys to recommend 
that their clients engage in asset protection planning primarily through 
offshore jurisdictions. The efficacy of asset protection planning should 
best be judged by its outcome. To date, the available case law suggests 
that ultimately no domestic self-settled spendthrift trust would be able to 
protect the trust assets,38 although a domestic trust could theoretically 
work where the trustee, the debtor, and the creditor all reside in a state 
that recognizes domestic asset protection trusts.39 However, that is an 
extremely narrow exception and, for the residents of the 34 states that 
have not enacted explicit DAPT statutes, offshore planning is arguably 
the only way to go. Moreover, offshore asset protection trust jurisdictions 
are governed by their own laws and do not always recognize other 
countries’ judgments unlike states, which are subject to enforce each 
other’s judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.40 
Many offshore jurisdictions offer user-friendly asset protection laws, 
and creditors are often unable to reach the trust assets.41 Domestic 
creditors face more complicated and costly paths to go to the foreign 
                                                                                                             
35 Id. at 945-945.02. 
36 Id. at 901.04. 
37 In re Castellano, 514 B.R. 555, 557-58 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. 2014). The trust in 
Castellano was established by the settlor in 1997 for the benefit of her four children. To 
protect the trust assets from any one child’s creditors, the settlor had thoughtfully 
included a conventional spendthrift clause before her death. The court was unmoved by 
the fact that the debtor had not settled a trust. The resulting arrangement was, in the eyes 
of the court, identical to a self-settled trust arrangement. Thus, Ms. Castellano’s creditors 
found themselves the recipients of a $400,000 windfall never intended to have gone to 
Ms. Castellano for the benefit of her creditors in the first place. 
38 Steven J. Oshins, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust: Combining It with the 
Double LLC Strategy, American Bar Association Section of Real Property Trust & Estate 
Law (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/probate_property_ma
gazine_2012/2013/january_february_2013/article_oshins_domestic_asset_protection_trus
t.html. 
39 A court in a non-DAPT state may choose to disregard a DAPT created in a state 
other than the grantor’s state of residence. See In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798, (Bankr. W.D. 
Wash. 2013). 
40 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
41 Supra  note 29. 
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jurisdiction and hope for a favorable local court order.42 The offshore 
asset protection trust serves as a filter, deterring frivolous claims and 
requiring that the creditor be resourceful and committed before gaining 
access to the foreign courthouse. Asset protection trusts established 
under the laws of offshore jurisdictions, such as Belize or Nevis, 
effectively deter unreasonable and unfounded creditors and reduce the 
profile of the debtor as a desirable deep-pocketed target.43 
II. HISTORIC CHALLENGES TO ASSET PROTECTION 
TRUSTS 
Asset protection historically has been critiqued and scrutinized by a 
society that is unsympathetic to debtors’ unwillingness or inability to pay 
creditors. The unremitting struggle between these two competing 
interests—those who may have a claim and those who have a right to 
dispose of their property as they wish—evades easy solutions. Both 
parties have rights which they can exercise within certain prescribed 
boundaries.44 A person of means should not be condemned for seeking to 
preserve wealth any more than the unanticipated creditor pursuing a 
speculative claim. Each is acting within the scope of his own rights. 
Asset protection is a reaction to a system that is often too liberal for 
not only tolerating meritless claims but also awarding extreme punitive 
damages.45 However, the law holds a bias against those who dare guard 
their assets; uniform fraudulent transfer laws, which are found in 44 
states and the District of Columbia, tilt the scales in favor of a creditor by 
affording special remedies where assets are transferred in an effort to 
defeat collection.46 Judges reinforce this bias with contempt orders, 
incarcerating debtors for having created their own impossibility to pay, 
essentially bringing back the much scorned “debtors prisons” of old 
England.47 Attorneys assisting with asset protection planning are also 
                                                                                                             
42 Engel, supra note 8 at 1020.06. 
43 See Donald F Conway v. Queensway Trustees Limited (Civ. App. No. 11 April 3, 
2000) (St. Kitts & Nevis).  
44 Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 4-
6 (5th ed. 2006). 
45 Lauren Pearle, ‘I’m Being Sued For WHAT?’, ABC NEWS (May 2, 2007), http://abc
news.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3121086&page=1. 
46 Legislative Fact Sheet—Fraudulent Transfer Act—now known as Voidable 
Transactions Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Legislative
FactSheet.aspx?title=Fraudulent%20Transfer%20Act%20-%20now%20known%20as%2
0Voidable%20Transactions%20Act. 
47 Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 2013 WL 6223564, *9 (Minn. App., 
Dec. 2, 2013). 
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being subjected to expanding scrutiny and experimental theories of 
liability, such as RICO, civil conspiracy, and common law fraud. 48 
A. Fraudulent Transfers and Common Misconceptions of the 
UFTA’s Purpose 
The primary remedy, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), 
for the creditors is also the source of common confusion and 
inconsistency among the courts due to its implied reference to fraud.49 
However, the UFTA is a legal remedy, a reversal of a transfer, and not 
necessarily a sign of fraud. The concept of “fraudulent transfer” of 
property originated from the English Statute of Elizabeth of 1571, 
otherwise known as the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 157150 The Statute 
was enacted to combat fraudulent deeds, alienation, and other transfers 
made before an individual became insolvent.51 Creditors were granted a 
special remedy through which the courts could void the conveyance of 
real property or chattels if the debtor was found to have acted with the 
intent of obstructing or defrauding creditors.52 Notably, the Statute of 
Elizabeth had no statute of limitation, meaning that a debtor transferring 
assets at any time could potentially see the transfer set aside far into the 
future by a creditor who did not exist at the time the transfer was first 
made.53   
Presently, the United States Bankruptcy Code and fraudulent transfer 
statutes enacted in most states follow many of the core principles first set 
out in the old English statute.54 Most states have implemented the UFTA, 
which is concerned with the validity of transfers that leave an owner 
insolvent and are intended to defraud creditors.55 Intent can be explicit or 
constructive, and there is a list of “badges of fraud” to guide courts in 
evaluating the transferor’s intent.56 If a transfer in trust is found to be 
fraudulent, the transfer is voidable in the hands of the trust and the 
expected protection fails.57 
Historically, planning early and setting enough funds aside to avoid 
insolvency in the presence of known creditors have been the key 
                                                                                                             
48 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2015). 
49 Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) (2014), available at http://www.unifor
mlaws.org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/2013oct_AUFTA_InterimDraft_MASTE
R%20KCK(2).pdf. 




54 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
55 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers § 4 (2015). 
56 UFTA supra note 49 at § 4(b). 
57 Supra note 55. 
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guidelines for debtors to not run afoul of the UFTA. Common law fills in 
the gaps by clarifying the relevance of “future creditors.”58 For example, 
in Klein v. Klein,, the court explained: 
[T]here has been found no authority that an action such 
as this must fail for the reason that the grantor, who was 
without creditors, feared for future dangers, real or 
imaginative. Surely his hands were as clean as any one 
who ever came into equity. What he did amounted to no 
more than insurance against a possible disaster.59 
Case law interpreting the UFTA reveals important distinctions 
among three classes of creditors: (i) Present creditors, (ii) reasonably 
foreseeable future creditors, and (iii) unknown future creditors.60 
Historically, those individuals who parted with their assets for the sake of 
peace of mind, and facilitated asset protection as a form of insurance, 
successfully overcame fraudulent transfer claims when such transfers 
were made before both present creditors and reasonably identifiable 
foreseeable future creditors, and the transferor retained sufficient assets 
so as not to become insolvent.61 
But recently, such planning has not been so effective. For example, 
in California, the UFTA has been interpreted by at least one court to 
invalidate the transfer when assets are transferred years before any 
potential creditor was identifiable.62 The California court invalidated a 
set of asset protection trusts specifically because, as part of the settlor’s 
original intent in establishing the trusts, the settlor sought to preserve his 
wealth from the reach of any creditors by utilizing the asset protection 
trust laws of Nevada.63 
The decision in California may perhaps be best explained as a 
combination of judicial bias against debtors unwilling or unable to pay 
their debts and a general misconception about fraudulent transfers. The 
finding of a fraudulent transfer is technically only a legal remedy that 
creditors rely on when pursuing a debtor’s assets, giving the court leeway 
to grant a range of remedies in favor of the creditor.64 But because many 
courts are not familiar with fraudulent transfer laws, they often 
misconstrue fraudulent transfers and equate them with common law 
                                                                                                             
58 See Klein v. Klein, 112 N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952). 
59 Id. at 548. 
60 See e.g. Kilker v. Stillman, supra note 4. 
61 See, e.g., Durant v. Durant, 439 A.2d 821 (Pa. 1982). 
62 See, e.g., Kilker, supra note 4 at *5-6. 
63 Id. 
64 See UFTA supra note 49 at §7(c). 
148 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:135 
fraud.65 To avoid confusion over the term “fraudulent,” the Uniform Law 
Committee has chosen to retitle the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act as 
the Uniform Voidable Transfer Act.66 
B. Contempt & Incarceration 
In addition to challenges presented by creditors asserting fraudulent 
transfers, some courts seek to punish the debtor for creating the 
circumstances by which it is impossible for the debtor to repay the 
creditor by incarcerating debtors in a modern-day version of debtors’ 
prison for contempt of court. Civil contempt is defined as an act defying 
the justice of the courts and interfering with the administration of 
justice.67 It may be punishable by a fine or imprisonment.68 In the context 
of asset protection planning, civil contempt is often relevant. Typically, 
the debtor establishes an offshore irrevocable trust and permanently 
surrenders legal title and control of the assets to an offshore trustee.69 
When the creditor tries to enforce a judgment against the debtor, the 
creditor will often ask the court to compel the debtor to retrieve the 
assets under threat of contempt.70 
What usually follows is the defense of impossibility: the debtor is 
commanded to bring the assets before the court and yet, the debtor has 
ceded ownership and control to someone else.71 A judge may sometimes 
issue a court order directing the trust settlor to reverse transfers made in 
trust and to remit the trust assets to the court.72 However, because the 
debtor does not control the trust, and the laws of the offshore asset 
protection trust jurisdiction invariably prohibit the trustee from remitting 
trust assets to satisfy creditor claims, the debtor is powerless to affect the 
result desired by the court.73 Accordingly, in some instances, trust 
settlors have been held in contempt of court and placed in jail.74 
                                                                                                             
65 Engel, supra note 8 at 215.03.  
66 Jay Adkisson, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act—What’s With The 
Name Change?, FORBES (July 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2014/0
7/18/the-uniform-voidable-transactions-act-whats-with-the-name-change/#6036c994
8f63. 
67 Black’s Law Dictionary 360 (9th ed. 2009). 
68 Engel, supra note 8 at 215.03. 
69 See, e.g., Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 596, 600 
(Minn. 2012). 
70 Id. at 599. 
71 See id. (inferring that the defendant presented the Impossibility Defense; he should 
have not been found in contempt of the Court’s Order to send the assets to the creditor, 
because he was in control of those assets and it was literally impossible for him to 
comply at that time.). 
72 Id. at 598. 
73 Id. at 599-600. 
74 Id. at 600. 
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Notwithstanding that settlors of offshore asset protection trusts 
sometimes find themselves jailed for contempt of court, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that debtors cannot be incarcerated for the mere purpose 
of compelling payment of debts.75 In some cases, judges appear to 
overlook the fact that the debtor has ceded control of his assets to an 
offshore trustee long ago and is powerless to affect their return.76 In other 
cases, courts distinguish between (i) impossibility attributable to external 
circumstances and (ii) self-created impossibility, with the former serving 
as a valid defense to a contempt citation and the latter not.77 Yet, this 
distinction between impossibility and self-created impossibility ignores 
Supreme Court precedent. A judge should think twice before taking a 
debtor’s freedom away when such a delicate distinction between 
impossibility and self-created impossibility is the deciding factor. 
Impossibility is impossibility, even if self-created for foolish or immoral 
purposes. “Impossibilium nulla obligation.”78 
At some point, domestic courts should recognize the limits of 
jurisdictional authority. Trustees residing in a jurisdiction such as Belize 
would never allow assets to be remitted to satisfy a creditor’s claims: 
They would not risk the reputation of the jurisdiction as a reliable 
location for asset protection trust services by complying with foreign 
judgments. 
The proper response, in the face of a genuine impossibility defense is 
for the domestic court to grant the creditor the requested judgment and to 
then encourage the creditor to utilize the procedures of the foreign 
jurisdiction in which the trust assets are held. Greater judicial deference 
to other countries and their legal systems would empower a domestic 
judge to better find that, while the grantor did create the circumstance of 
impossibility by transferring assets to a third party, the fact remains that 
the debtor is unable to reverse the transfer. Rather than holding the 
debtor in contempt and imprisoning the debtor to secure payment of a 
debt, an abhorrent practice that was abolished centuries ago, domestic 
courts must instead recognize the limits of their authority and the reality 
of the legal landscape that confronts the creditor. 
                                                                                                             
75 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671, (1983) (noting that imprisoning one who, 
with no fault of his own, is incapable of paying his debts despite making good faith 
efforts, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.). 
76 See e.g., Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, supra note 47. 
77 See e.g., In re Coker, 251 B.R. 902, 905 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000). 
78 JAMES T. BRETZKE, CONSECRATED PHRASES: A LATIN THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY; 
LATIN EXPRESSIONS COMMONLY FOUND IN THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 101 (3rd ed. 2013) 
(meaning “Nothing impossible can oblige.”). 
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C. Attorney Liability—Ethics Violations 
One consequence of effective asset protection planning, particularly 
offshore, is pressuring creditors to find new avenues for recovery, 
including suing those attorneys who engage in asset protection planning 
on behalf of their clients. The United States has historically afforded the 
freedom to dispose of one’s property, and this right ought to be given 
adequate weight when it has been exercised when no identifiable third 
party claimants may be affected.79 Moreover, legal counsel, advising 
within the boundaries of the law, should not have to fear the legal 
consequences of asset protection. Yet, creditors occasionally sue 
attorneys, and such lawsuits may have a chilling effect on asset 
protection planning. 
Attorneys who engage in asset protection planning frequently lean on 
Rule 1.2(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which states:80 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a 
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal 
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a 
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good 
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or 
application of the law.81 
Here, “fraud” or “fraudulent” refers to purposeful behavior to 
deceive.82 Assisting a client in defrauding known or foreseeable creditors 
                                                                                                             
79 Adler v. Fenton, 65 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1860). 
“Our laws determine with accuracy the time and manner in which the 
property of a debtor ceases to be subject to his disposition, and 
becomes subject to the rights of his creditor. A creditor acquires a 
lien upon the lands of his debtor by a judgment; and upon the 
personal goods of the debtor, by the delivery of an execution to the 
sheriff. It is only by these liens that a creditor has any vested or 
specific right in the property of his debtor. Before these liens are 
acquired, the debtor has full dominion over his property; he may 
convert one species of property into another, and he may alienate to a 
purchaser. The rights of the debtor, and those of a creditor, are thus 
defined by positive rules; and the points at which the power of the 
debtor ceases, and the right of the creditor commences, are clearly 
established. These regulations cannot be contravened or varied by 
any interposition of equity.”  
Id. (quoting Moran v. Dawes, 1 Hopk. Ch. 365, 367 (N.Y. 1825). 
80 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(d) (2002). 
81 Id. 
82 See The New York Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.0(i) (2011) (“ . . . does not 
include conduct that, although characterized as fraudulent by statute or administrative 
rule, lacks an element of scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or knowing failure to correct 
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would be fraudulent and a violation of the model rules, and the attorney 
would face disciplinary charges for such actions.83 By contrast, asset 
protection planning meant to preserve wealth—and not intended to avoid 
a known creditor—does not fall within the scope of “fraudulent” 
behavior prohibited by the Model Rules.84 In an ironic twist, some 
attorneys argue that an attorney could be liable for professional 
malpractice if the attorney does not recommend asset protection planning 
to clients in need of such planning.85 
D. Civil Conspiracy / Aiding & Abetting 
In a desperate effort to overturn the efficacy of asset protection 
planning, some creditors have embraced theories of recovery based on 
common law tort claims, such as civil conspiracy, or by seeking statutory 
remedies originally intended to fight against organized crime.86 
These emerging theories of liability may prove to be of limited utility 
to creditors.87 Setting aside the merits of any particular claim, as a 
general principle of law, it is very difficult for a creditor to hold an 
attorney liable for asset protection planning advice. For example, the 
majority approach on civil conspiracy, exemplified by Texas and Florida, 
is that a fraudulent transfer, without a showing of badges of fraud, 
exonerates the asset protection attorney from liability.88 Creditors may 
pursue the transferee of the fraudulent transfer but are limited only to the 
conveyed assets.89 In Freeman vs. First Union National Bank, the 
Supreme Court of Florida made clear the legal distinction between a 
“fraudulent transfer” and a “fraud.”90 In a unanimous ruling, the court 
found that: 
To adopt the [creditor’s] position in this case would be 
to expand the [Florida] UFTA beyond its facial 
application and in a manner that is outside the purpose 
                                                                                                             
misrepresentations that can be reasonably expected to induce detrimental reliance by 
another.”). 
83 See Elie v. Smith, 2011 WL 9349985 (Cal. App. Supp. Oct. 13, 2011). 
84 See Peter Spero, Asset Protection: Legal Planning, Strategies and Forms § 2.03-6-b 
(vol. 1, 2001). 
85 Daniel S. Rubin, Asset Protection Planning – Ethical? Legal? Obligatory? 18-1, 18-
12, Institute of Estate Planning (2014), available at http://www.mosessinger.com/site/file
s/asset_protection_planning_rubin.pdf. 
86 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588 (1981). 
87 See, e.g., Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1993) (holding that 
aiding and abetting claims are not sufficient to satisfy the element that the defendant 
operated the enterprise.). 
88 See Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank, 865 So.2d 1272, 1277 (Fla. 2004). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1277. 
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and plain language of the statute. Consistent with this 
analysis we conclude that [Florida] UFTA was not 
intended to serve as a vehicle by which a creditor may 
bring a suit against a non-transferee party . . . for 
monetary damages arising from the non-transferee 
party’s alleged aiding-abetting of a fraudulent money 
transfer. Accordingly, we answer the certified question 
in the negative and return this case to the Eleventh 
Circuit.91 
On the other side of the country, California has outlined a minority 
view, where attorneys may be liable for civil conspiracy even if they 
were not the transferee of the debtor’s assets.92 Unlike the UFTA 
implemented in Florida, the UFTA implemented by California is silent 
on civil conspiracy when engaging in a fraudulent transfer.93 The 
minority approach equates a fraudulent transfer with a tort theory of 
fraud; accordingly, the fraudulent transfer forms the element of fraud 
needed to bring a cause of action for conspiracy.94 Thus, a fraudulent 
transfer can give rise to liability for the asset protection attorney, even if 
the attorney is not a transferee of debtor assets. 
The differences between the majority and minority approach are 
significant, especially when California courts have interpreted the UFTA 
to make asset protection planning a per se fraudulent transfer against 
future unanticipated creditors.95 Asset protection attorneys in California 
may be compelled by the combination of civil liability for fraud based on 
a fraudulent transfer and an expansive definition of fraudulent transfers 
to rethink the jurisdiction they practice in. Alternatively, attorneys in 
California may consider referring asset protection planning clients to 
attorneys in one of the fifteen states that has enacted a domestic asset 
protection trust law. 
                                                                                                             
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., Durant Software v. Herman, 255 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), 
reh’g granted, opinion not citeable (Feb. 24, 1989), vacated, 257 Cal. Rptr. 200 (Cal Ct. 
App. 1989) review granted and opinion superseded, 775 P.2d 1034 (Cal. 1989) (when 
attorneys exceed their role as an advocate and conduct in a intentionally fraudulent way, 
that the attorney will not escape liability). 
93 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?
section=civ&group=03001-04000&file=3439-3439.14. 
94 Courts often mistakenly equate a “fraudulent transfer” with “fraud,” and handle a 
fraudulent transfer as a common law fraud. See, e.g. Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343 (5th 
Cir. 1984); Freeman v. First Union Nat’l Bank, supra note 88. 
95 See e.g. Kilker v. Stillman, supra note 4. 
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E. Civil RICO 
The latest strategy to implead attorneys when challenging transfers in 
trust is under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”).96 This potentially overbroad interpretation 
of RICO disregards the legislative intent of the Act and may lead to 
manipulation by opportunistic plaintiffs and become the case of “be 
careful of what you wish for.” This is a more creative cause of action 
against the attorney as it surprisingly equates his advocacy of asset 
protection with organized mafia activities, which inspired Congress to 
enact RICO.97 
Even though any person or business damaged under RICO may seek 
relief, RICO was enacted to fight organized crime, not to permit a cause 
of action in federal courts for any tort claim.98 RICO prohibits any 
individual employed by or linked to a qualifying enterprise “‘to conduct 
or participate in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern 
of racketeering activity . . . .’”99 RICO provides a civil cause of action 
against a defendant who acts through or administers an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering.100 To succeed in a civil RICO action, a 
plaintiff must establish on the part of the defendant (1) conduct (2) of an 
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity; (5) causing 
injury to his ‘business or property.101 The successful claimant is allowed 
to recover treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and other expenses under 
RICO.102 
RICO section 1962(c) proscribes defendants from operating or 
managing an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.103 The 
term “enterprise” is defined quite broadly as “any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”104 Under such a 
broad definition it is conceivable that a law firm, or an attorney, working 
in association with a client engaged in asset protection planning may 
become a target of a civil RICO claim. 
                                                                                                             
96 See generally 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) (2015). 
97 See Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1349 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Fortney v. 
Kuipers, No. 98C5387, 2001 WL 1539143 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2001). 
98 Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1992). 
99 Alexander v. Incway Corp., No. CV 11-8851 DSF (VBKX), 2013 WL 5603932, *17 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. 
Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985). 
100 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2015). 
101 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496; 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2015). 
102 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2015). 
103 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2015). 
104 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2015). 
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Predicate offenses, such as wire fraud, mail fraud, and other state and 
federal crimes, are referred to as racketeering activity by RICO.105 A 
“pattern of racketeering activity,” demarcated by as at least two acts of 
racketeering activity, marks a distinction from the isolated act.106 
Attorneys who commit at least predicate offenses may be subject to a 
RICO claim on the basis of a pattern of racketeering. 
Fortunately for attorneys, a critical element of any RICO claim is the 
last element: proximate causation.107 The most common defense cited by 
attorneys who have been charged with civil RICO liability is the absence 
of a causal link between the asset protection planning services provided 
by the lawyer and the injury suffered by a creditor who was not 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the planning.108 As the Supreme 
Court has observed, “At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects 
‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible 
and convenient.’”109 
The proximate cause requirement for civil RICO liability echoes a 
similar requirement found in the Sherman and Clayton Acts and is based 
on a policy decision to limit liability to instances when the plaintiff 
establishes legal causation.110 As the Supreme Court noted, “Here we use 
‘proximate cause’ to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a 
person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own 
acts.”111 According to the Sixth Circuit, monetary loss alone is 
insufficient to establish proximate cause.112 Rather, proximate causation 
under RICO requires a direct relationship between the injury suffered 
and the alleged injurious conduct.113 Thus, the concept of direct injury 
refers to the relationship between the injury and the defendant’s actions 
and should not be based on the plaintiff’s ability to pay.114 There is also a 
requirement that an attorney must be a director or officer of the 
enterprise to incur liability.115 Therefore, it follows that an attorney who 
simply refers business to an offshore trust company will not fall under 
                                                                                                             
105 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2015). 
106 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2015). 
107 See, e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 268 (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and 
Keeton on Law of Torts § 41 (5th ed. 1984). 
110 Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 285 (6th Cir. 1992). 
111 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, 
Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 41 (5th ed. 1984). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 259. 
114 Firestone, 976 F.2d at 285. 
115 See, e.g., Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993). 
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the reach of RICO because he is not a director or an officer of the 
challenged entity. 
Civil RICO claims are wholly inapplicable to the field of asset 
protection. Congress enacted RICO with the purpose of eradicating 
organized crime.116 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
RICO’s far-reaching text should be interpreted narrowly as to not exceed 
the Act’s scope.117 Courts should also consider: 
[W]hether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his 
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify 
exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.118 
To permit an extension of RICO into the asset protection planning 
sphere distorts the purpose of RICO and invites Congress to curtail its 
reach at the expense of those who are legitimate victims of organized 
crime. 
III. EMERGING DOCTRINE: THE “PER SE” 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER RULE  
Courts increasingly scrutinize the motives of debtors engaged in 
asset protection planning. Recent case law reveals the rising challenges 
for those exercising the right to protect their wealth and taking 
precautionary steps, such as advance planning. The minority approach, 
emerging from states like California, finds that when one transfers assets 
to protect assets, the transfer is fraudulent under the UFTA as to present 
and reasonably foreseeable future creditors, as well as unknown future 
creditors.119 This approach raises the fear that residents of minority-view 
states cannot engage in asset protection planning whatsoever. 
                                                                                                             
116 H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 245 (1989). 
117 Id. 
118 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
204 (1962)). 
119 See, e.g., Kilker v. Stillman, 2012 WL 5902348, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012). 
See also In re Castellano, supra note 37. It must be noted that this is not the most recent 
decision in this case; however, this article was written before the latest decision was 
made and the law is still unclear as to whether the asset protection trusts will not be 
biased in the bankruptcy context. See Safanda v. Castellano, No. 14 CV 07094, 2015 WL 
1911130 (N.D.Ill. April 27, 2015). See also Jay Adkisson, Estate Planning Bar Breathes 
Sign of Relief As Castellano Gets Turned Around, FORBES (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2015/05/25/estate-planning-bar-breathes-sigh-
of-relief-as-castellano-gets-turned-around/#57a02b9d455f. 
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 In light of California trial and appellate court rulings in Kilker v. 
Stillman120 and In re Cutuli,121 the forecast is stacked against domestic 
asset protection trusts. Non-DAPT states may choose to ignore the 
DAPT structure and the legal rules that protect DAPT assets, whether 
using the UFTA or applying the “alter ego” doctrine to disregard the 
DAPT.122 In addition, creditors may reach the assets of a DAPT by 
relying on the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforce judgments 
obtained against a DAPT in a non-DAPT state.123 In Kilker, a California 
court regarded the selection of Nevada asset protection trust laws as the 
governing law for a trust settled by a California resident to be per 
se fraudulent against future unknown creditors.124 Employing a very 
similar rationale, a bankruptcy court in Washington refused to honor the 
selection of Alaska DAPT laws to govern a trust established by a resident 
of Washington even though no present or known creditors existed at the 
time of trust creation.125 Finally, in In re Cutuli, a Florida bankruptcy 
court approved the use of a warrant to seize attorney-client 
correspondence where the client, a petitioner in bankruptcy, engaged a 
law firm which advertised its services in asset protection planning.126 All 
three cases present glimpses of how courts remain skeptical of asset 
protection planning motives and, in the case of the rulings in Washington 
and California, the viability of DAPT planning for residents of non-
DAPT states. Responsible practitioners would be wise to consider the 
merits of a foreign asset protection trust (“FAPT”) in light of the risks 
associated with DAPTs. 
A. Kilker v. Stillman 
This unpublished yet critical case signifies perhaps the greatest threat 
the domestic asset protection trust industry faces today. Kilker represents 
an emerging trend that would functionally impose “strict liability” 
                                                                                                             
120 See Kilker, supra. 
121 In re Cutuli, No. 11-35256-BKC-AJC, 2013 WL 5236711 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 
16, 2013). 
122 See, e.g., Kilker, 2012 WL 5902348 at *6; see also In re Castellano, 514 B.R. at 
559-60. 
123 See, e.g., IMO Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust, No. CIV.A. 9685-VCL, 2014 WL 
3924309 (Del. Ch. 2014); U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; Cf. Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. 
v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 304 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); BNA Portfolio 810-3rd, Asset 
Protection Planning, pp. A-53-54. 
124 Kilker v. Stillman, 2012 WL 5902348 at *4. 
125 In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013). 
126 In re Cutuli, supra note 121. 
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through a per se fraudulent transfer rule:127 Namely, that planning to 
protect assets constitutes “actual intent” to defraud future unforeseen 
creditors.128 Technically, the case is non-binding and reflects only a 
minority view. One may also quarrel with the appeals court’s reasoning 
on choice of law issues. Nevertheless, the court’s rationale in Kilker 
sends out the message of disapproval of asset protection. 
In 2000, the Kilkers engaged Curcies Coordinated Construction 
(“Curcies”) to erect a swimming pool on their land.129 Curcies employed 
Stillman to execute soil testing prior to the pool’s construction.130 Based 
on Stillman’s report, the pool was built.131 In 2008, the Kilkers filed a 
lawsuit against Curcies and Stillman, seeking damages due to a parting in 
the mastic seal of the pool.132 The Kilkers settled with Stillman for 
$92,500.00.133 After Stillman failed to pay the settled amount, a trial 
court in California entered a judgment against Stillman.134 
The Kilkers attempted to enforce the judgment by levying on a 
property, the Railroad Street property, only to find that the ownership 
had been conveyed to an irrevocable trust, the WWG Trust.135 In 2004, 
Stillman created a Nevada asset protection trust and transferred most of 
his assets into it.136 The Kilkers sought to invalidate Stillman’s original 
transfer of the Railroad Street property, claiming that the transfer in trust 
was a fraudulent conveyance under the UFTA.137 Stillman attested that, 
after the transfers in 2004, he was insolvent and received no 
consideration in return for conveying the properties.138 Additionally, he 
was blunt in stating that his intention in establishing and funding the trust 
was to engage in asset protection planning and shield himself from any 
creditors.139 The original trustees of the WWG Trust were employees of 
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an accounting firm that helped establish the trust.140 Stillman’s brother 
was the sole trust beneficiary.141 Throughout the history of the trust, 
Stillman regularly used the assets of the trust to cover his personal 
expenses, including cell phone and credit card bills, personal attorney 
fees, XM radio bills, and newspaper subscriptions.142 
The trial court ruled for the Kilkers, invalidating the transfer in trust 
based on Stillman’s testimony that he intended to hinder future 
unforeseen creditors by setting up the Nevada trust.143 The court also 
found that the WWG Trust was the “alter ego” of Stillman, as the trust 
was used by Stillman as a personal pocketbook for so many years.144 The 
key to the trial court’s ruling, which was upheld on appeal, was a novel 
interpretation of California UFTA section 3439.04(a), which provides: 
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim 
arose before or after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer 
or incurred the obligation as follows: (1) With actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor. (2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the 
debtor either: (A) Was engaged or was about to engage 
in a business or a transaction for which the remaining 
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation 
to the business or transaction. (B) Intended to incur, or 
believed or reasonably should have believed that he or 
she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as 
they became due.145 
The trial court found the Kilkers to be “reasonably foreseeable” 
creditors, despite the fact that their claim arose four years after the 
establishment of the trust and eight years after Stillman had produced the 
report that gave rise to the cause of action.146 The court reasoned that 
because soil engineers are frequently sued, all customers of a soil 
engineer constitute reasonably foreseeable future creditors.147 
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On appeal, the reviewing court upheld the finding of a fraudulent 
transfer by interpreting the UFTA broadly.148 Even though section 
3439.04(a) does not reference future creditors, the appeals court 
extended the meaning of creditor to include any creditor, both present 
and future.149 The appeals court eliminated any distinction between 
known or reasonably foreseeable creditors and future unknown 
creditors.150 
By interpreting the statute to protect future unforeseen creditors, the 
appeals court then needed to decide whether the prior transfer in trust of 
the Railroad Street property was a fraudulent transfer at the time it was 
made.151 The court considered evidence that Stillman’s actual intent was 
to defraud his “creditors,” including the fact that he was insolvent 
following the transfer in trust, had received no consideration in exchange 
for the transfer in trust, and continued to exercise control over the trust 
assets following the transfer.152 The California court treated such facts as 
proof of “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor.”153 
Stillman contended that because the WWG Trust had been 
established under Nevada law, the issue of a fraudulent transfer should 
have been determined under Nevada law.154 Furthermore, Stillman 
argued that Nevada’s domestic asset protection trust laws protected such 
transfers against claims from future unknown creditors, and his retained 
powers over the trust were permitted under Nevada law.155 The 
California court did not engage in a conflict of laws discussion and 
simply pointed out that Nevada’s UFTA must be interpreted the same 
way in Nevada due to the identical verbiage of the UFTA, which was 
meant to achieve uniformity among the states in regard to the law of 
fraudulent transfers.156 Because the UFTA in both California and Nevada 
contained similar wording, the appeals court determined that a Nevada 
court would inevitably reach the same conclusion as the trial court in 
California, to wit, evidence of actual intent to avoid future creditors 
constituted a fraudulent transfer under the UFTA.157 
California courts blatantly disregarded the very premise of Nevada’s 
asset protection trust laws ratifying such structures for general asset 
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protection purposes. Asset protection trust laws in Nevada would 
generally cut off creditor claims two years after any transfer in trust. 
California, however, does not have asset protection trust laws, giving rise 
to a direct conflict of laws that was not addressed by the court in this 
case. 
The better approach would have been that the UFTA only protects 
known or reasonably foreseeable creditors and not unforeseen future 
creditors. This interpretation of the UFTA would arguably yield the same 
result in cases brought in both asset protection trust states, such as 
Nevada, and those states that do not confer any particular asset protection 
trust benefits, like California. If the California court were correct, it 
would be impossible to have any asset protection trust in Nevada. While 
the California appellate court relied on the underlying purpose of the 
UFTA,158 the court should have simultaneously looked into the purpose 
of asset protection trust laws enacted in Nevada. 
Unfortunately for residents of California and other non-DAPT states, 
the choice of law issue is not critical to the creditor’s fraudulent transfer 
argument.159 By applying the “alter ego” doctrine, the Kilker ruling 
provides an avenue whereby creditors may sidestep uncomfortable 
questions regarding choice of law. Instead, a finding under local law that 
the trust is a sham frees the court to disregard Nevada domestic asset 
protection trust law completely. After all, if the trust does not exist, there 
is no context by which Nevada law applies. 
Those in the DAPT industry in Nevada and other states ignore the 
Kilker ruling by pointing to the unpublished status of the appeals court’s 
ruling, or the mea culpa delivered by Stillman in his deposition. 
However, it is folly to ignore the significant threat imposed by Kilker. 
Asset protection attorneys would better serve their clients by considering 
the impact of this ruling and evaluate alternate structures and 
jurisdictions for planning. 
The sad irony is that Stillman would have been better served by 
wasting his assets. By disclosing that he had tried to preserve his wealth, 
Stillman set himself up to be punished. The Kilker ruling places residents 
of California in a permanently disadvantaged position compared to 
residents of the sixteen states that have enacted DAPT laws. 
Notwithstanding precedent allowing the disposition of property in the 
absence of claims and creditors, the healthy distinction between (i) 
present foreseeable creditors and (ii) future unknown creditors appears to 
have evaporated in some non-DAPT states, like California. In addition to 
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protecting creditors’ rights, courts should weigh other factors as a matter 
of public policy, including the rights of people to know where their 
liability begins and where it ends. 
As the security of property ownership declines, 
investments flee and the economic environment becomes 
unstable, no one wants to invest where earning will be 
heavily taxed, or even the possibility of direct 
confiscation on the allegation of having violated a 
plethora of unknowable, unobservable laws.160 
Arguably, the Kilkers should not have been permitted to bring claims 
that dated back eight years. Statutes of limitations exist to draw a line at 
some point and cut off liability, giving people certainty and predictability 
in the law. Individuals should not feel threatened to spend their savings 
on desired commodities because some potential creditor may have a 
claim against them eight years later. Otherwise, rational people may 
avoid becoming soil engineers, like Stillman, and steer clear of 
occupations that incur frequent litigation. Courts in non-DAPT states 
may eventually demand mandatory reserves for the relief of 
unforeseeable creditors. 
Stillman may have sought protection of his wealth,161 but his 
formulation of intent was oversimplified, which prejudiced the outcome. 
His desire to preserve his wealth was equated with an intent to defraud 
future creditors. By finding his planning as constituting a fraudulent 
transfer, even as to future unforeseen creditors, the California appeals 
court took away a valuable property right previously found to exist at 
law. After all, in 1861, the Supreme Court properly conferred the timing 
of when creditors are allowed to exercise their rights: 
Our laws determine with accuracy the time and manner 
in which the property of a debtor ceases to be subject to 
his deposition, and becomes subject to the rights of his 
creditor. A creditor acquires a lien upon the lands of his 
debtor by a judgment; and upon the personal goods of 
the debtor, by the delivery of an execution to the sheriff. 
It is only by these liens that a creditor has any vested or 
specific right in the property of his debtor. Before these 
liens are acquired, the debtor has full dominion over his 
property; he may convert one species of the property 
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into another, and he may alienate to a purchaser. The 
rights of the debtor, and those of a creditor, are thus 
defined by positive rules; and the points at which the 
power of the debtor ceases, and the right of the creditor 
commences, are clearly established. These regulations 
cannot be contravened or varied by any interposition of 
equity.162 
B. In re Huber 
Another case prejudiced against asset protection arose out of a 
Washington bankruptcy court and its decision to decline applying the 
asset protection trust laws of Alaska to the transfers made in trust by a 
resident of Washington.163 The rationale behind this bankruptcy court’s 
decision foreshadows a trend of hostility toward asset protection trusts 
settled by residents of states that do not recognize asset protection 
trusts.164 The Huber ruling offers a glimpse into understanding similar 
California and Washington state court rulings that disregard transfers 
into self-settled spendthrift trusts. 
Donald G. Huber worked in real estate development and 
management for 40 years.165 His customers ranged from individual 
homebuyers to large builders.166 In the typical deal, Huber used a 
corporation or limited liability company to direct his investment in the 
project, often owning the entire project through the business entity.167 
Huber also served as a personal guarantor on loans advanced by banks to 
entities in which he was a principal.168 
According to the bankruptcy examiner in the case, Huber must have 
known about the “gathering storm clouds” that were about to hit the real 
estate industry in late 2007 and early 2008.169 In 2008, Huber settled an 
Alaskan spendthrift trust and conveyed almost all of his assets into the 
trust.170 As revealed in subsequent discovery, emails among Huber, his 
son, and his estate planning attorney indicated that the sole purpose of 
the trust was to “protect a portion of assets from creditors.”171 The emails 
also conveyed a significant degree of urgency in setting up the trust. 
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In 2011, Huber filed for bankruptcy and, in 2012, the bankruptcy 
trustee sought to invalidate the Alaskan spendthrift trust, claiming that 
Huber had transferred assets to the trust in violation of sections 548(e)(1) 
and 544(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.172 At trial, Huber contended 
that he had transferred his assets to the trust at a time when there were no 
claims or known creditors.173 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court found 
that Huber had constructive knowledge of potential creditors and an 
awareness of the distinct likelihood that he would be unable to repay his 
creditors following the transfers to the trust.174 Accordingly, the 
bankruptcy court found a fraudulent transfer under both state law and 
section 548(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.175 Additionally, by finding a 
fraudulent transfer to a self-settled spendthrift trust, the bankruptcy court 
invoked the 10-year clawback rule of section 548(e)(1) of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, requiring all transfers from the debtor to the trust for 
the ten-year period preceding the bankruptcy filing to be included in the 
bankruptcy estate.176 
The bankruptcy trustee originally asked that the court nullify the 
trust under the laws of Washington, notwithstanding that the trust had 
been formed under the laws of Alaska.177 The bankruptcy court 
addressed the conflict of laws issue by first turning to the Restatement on 
Conflicts of Laws.178 Under the reasoning of the Restatement, the choice 
of Alaska law would be sustained if Alaska had an extensive relation to 
the trust. Restatement section 270(a), comment b, provides that: 
[A] state has a substantial relation to a trust if at the time 
the trust is created: (1) the trustee or settlor is domiciled 
in the state; (2) the assets are located in the state; and (3) 
the beneficiaries are domiciled in the state. These 
contacts with the state are not exclusive.179 
Huber did not reside in Alaska, the trust assets were not located in 
Alaska, and none of the beneficiaries were residents of Alaska.180 Only 
one of the trustees resided in Alaska, and the trust was administered in 
Alaska.181 
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By comparison, the bankruptcy court found that Washington has a 
robust public policy barring the use of self-settled spendthrift trusts.182 
Explicitly, transfers to self-settled spendthrift trusts are invalidated if 
made for the purpose of avoiding present or future creditors of the 
settlor.183 According to the bankruptcy court, this view is consistent 
among the vast majority of states.184 In support of this observation, the 
court referred to the oft-cited case of Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy, 
in which a bankruptcy court reflected on New York’s public policy 
disapproving the use of self-settled trusts.185 
The bankruptcy court accordingly chose to apply Washington law to 
determine the validity of the trust and transfers to the trust.186 The court 
considered each of the badges of fraud at the time Huber funded his trust, 
focusing specifically on the following badges of fraud: (1) Real or 
upcoming litigation; (2) an unsubstantiated transfer of most of the 
debtor’s property; (3) insolvency or other indebtedness of the debtor; (4) 
a distinct relationship between the debtor and the transferee; and, after 
the transfer, (5) retaining control of the assets transferred by the 
debtor.187 The bankruptcy court found five badges of fraud.188 The court 
also concluded that Huber had acted out of a desire to protect his 
wealth.189 Huber proclaimed that he had established the trust for estate 
planning purposes, but the court found that the circumstances and timing 
of the formation of the trust, along with the assets transferred into the 
trust, revealed his true motive: asset protection.190 
The bankruptcy trustee argued that Huber was motivated by the 
corrupt pursuit of asset protection.191 Huber failed to properly articulate 
sound arguments in his own defense. Nevertheless, the rationale of the 
bankruptcy court in Huber comes as no surprise when compared with the 
ruling in Kilker: If asset protection planning is identified as the primary 
motive for the transfers undertaken by the debtor, modern courts are 
inclined to grant relief to the creditor. While the decision in Huber may 
be limited to those circumstances in which a debtor avoids present 
creditors or guarantors, Kilker illustrates that even unknown future 
creditors may be able to challenge transfers in trust. 
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C. In re Cutuli 
 In re Cutuli is one of those bad cases involving bad actors and 
bad facts, giving asset protection planning a bad reputation. The parties 
in this case intentionally sought to hide assets, employing all possible 
means to defraud a judgment creditor.192 The actions of the debtor in 
Cutuli serve as a vivid example of how not to engage in asset protection 
planning. As explained below, the debtor should have never been 
assisted by the attorneys in her case. 
The debtor, Kathleen Smith-Cutuli (“Smith”), had been a partner in a 
winery business, Napa Smith Brewery & Winery, LLC, for 17 years with 
“Elie.”193 Their partnership ended in 2005, when their joint business was 
sold.194 Litigation ensued between the two thereafter, and Elie obtained a 
judgment against Smith in August 2009, for roughly $6 million.195 
Rather than waving the white flag and giving up to Elie whatever 
funds she had left, Smith decided to take a different, much more 
aggressive course of action.196 The scheme that she concocted with the 
assistance of California counsel involved several steps.197 First, Smith 
entered into a pre-marital agreement with her fiancé, Cutuli, that made 
clear that each of them would maintain their pre-marital assets and 
liabilities separate of each other once they married.198 Next, Cutuli 
brought a quiet title action against Smith relating to real estate located in 
California.199 Smith declined to wage any form of defense, and Cutuli 
obtained a $10 million default judgment against his fiancé.200 In the 
intervening period between the execution of the pre-marital agreement 
and Cutuli obtaining the default judgment, Elie sued Smith in a 
California court and procured a judgment against her on the $6 million 
debt.201 As Elie prepared to collect on his judgment, Smith transferred 
her assets to Cutuli, supposedly to satisfy Cutuli’s judgment against 
Smith.202 
When Elie conducted discovery to try and collect on his judgment, 
Elie learned that Smith and Cutuli had worked in concert to transfer 
                                                                                                             
192 Id. 
193 Elie v. Smith, 2011 WL 9349985 (Cal. App. Supp. Oct. 13, 2011). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 In re Cutuli, No. 11-35256-BKC-AJC, 2013 WL 5236711 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 
16, 2013). 





202 Id. at *4-5. 
166 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:135 
assets as part of Cutuli’s judgment against Smith.203 Smith left 
California, failing to respond to the ongoing proceedings in Elie’s action 
and incurring a bench warrant for her arrest.204 In a novel move, Elie 
brought a claim for abuse of process in California against Smith, Cutuli, 
and the attorney who had advised them on the quiet title action.205 The 
essence of Elie’s complaint was that the quiet title action had been 
fraudulently obtained and was intended as a ruse to hide Smith’s assets 
from Elie.206 
In September 2011, Smith, who had relocated to Florida with Cutuli, 
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.207 Smith and Cutuli hired a law 
firm of “asset protection experts,” the Andersen Firm, and one of their 
attorneys, Matt Harrod, to help further their ambitious scheme.208 Harrod 
recommended the formation of a Wyoming LLC with an offshore bank 
account in the Isle of Man.209 
Back in California, the evidence of fraudulent transfers unveiled by 
the court was overwhelming.210 Weeks after learning of the original 
California judgment, Smith had transferred three luxury vehicles to her 
fiancé, valued at over $300,000.211 Smith and Cutuli also took out a 
mortgage of $1 million against their real estate.212 The quiet title action 
was found to be a bogus attempt to hide assets.213 The California court 
ruled in favor of Elie and further awarded treble damages against Smith 
and her cohorts.214 The court further ordered that Smith’s and Cutuli’s 
assets be held in a constructive trust pending Elie’s collection of the 
awards.215 
When news of the California action reached the attention of the 
bankruptcy court in Florida, the bankruptcy court issued a warrant to 
seize Smith and Cutuli’s books, records, and computers, including email 
correspondence with the Andersen Firm and Harrod. Cutuli challenged 
the warrant on grounds of privileged attorney-client communications. 
However, the court sustained the warrant on the basis that the prima 
facie record called for application of the crime fraud exception to 
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attorney-client privilege. The bankruptcy court focused on the fact that 
the debtor had hired a law firm that promoted its services in asset 
protection planning, as it was considered evidence of bad intent. 
As a result of an accumulation of critically poor decisions, Smith, 
Cutuli, and their Florida attorneys were now looking at potential 
bankruptcy fraud—a crime—for having conducted Wyoming and 
offshore asset protection planning. This is in addition to the treble 
damages Smith, Cutuli, and their California counsel faced from the 
bogus quiet title action back in California. 
At this point, Cutuli should be contrasted with Kilker: The debtor in 
Cutuli acted with actual intent to defraud known creditors, whereas the 
debtor in Kilker was acting consistent with the DAPT laws of Nevada 
well ahead of any reasonably foreseeable creditors. The “asset 
protection” planning conducted by the attorneys in Cutuli was not legal 
planning but rather a fraudulent attempt to hide assets. By comparison, 
debtors such as in Kilker are generally transparent in their planning, 
intending to rely on the protections afforded under DAPT or FAPT laws, 
not the creditor’s inability to locate debtor assets. 
While the debtor in Cutuli was assessed treble damages, one should 
not conclude that this outcome would apply in other cases involving 
fraudulent transfers. The sizable punitive damages were awarded based 
on a finding of common law fraud alongside the fraudulent transfers 
made by the debtor: “[A] far-reaching scheme to defraud creditors 
including findings of ‘actual’ or ‘intentional’ as well as ‘constructive’ 
fraud.”216 Had the debtor not conspired to file the sham quiet title action, 
the creditor’s claims might have been more strictly limited to those 
remedies afforded under the UFTA. 
Competent counsel would caution a client engaged in asset 
protection planning to consider the consequences if the client later files 
for bankruptcy. Inevitably, the bankruptcy court will learn of the asset 
protection planning and deny the debtor a discharge. Worse, the debtor 
may learn that asset protection planning pursued in contemplation of an 
imminent bankruptcy filing, or following a bankruptcy filing, may entail 
criminal prosecution of the debtor for bankruptcy fraud. 
IV. BUILDING THE BETTER CASE FOR ASSET 
PROTECTION 
The common theme running through the rulings in Kilker, Huber, 
and Cutuli is the court’s intense focus on asset protection motives 
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underlying the debtor’s actions. This raises an important question: Does 
the presence of an asset protection motive profoundly affect the outcome 
of the case? Recent case law indicates that a finding of an asset 
protection motive on the part of the debtor is a significant factor, if not 
the determining factor, in considering whether the court will honor the 
debtor’s planning arrangements or disregard them entirely. 
A. “Integrated”217 and Vigilant Estate Planning 
As recent case law indicates, early planning may not be enough in 
certain jurisdictions like California.218 Factors such as the solvency of the 
debtor, the presence of one or more badges of intent, and whether any 
consideration is received in exchange for the debtor’s assets will be 
scrutinized on an ad hoc basis.219 
At a minimum, attorneys advising clients in asset protection planning 
should conduct thorough due diligence on the solvency of their clients.220 
The lawyer should request financial statements, preferably prepared by a 
certified public accountant, detailing the client’s net worth and cash 
flow.221 In addition, the lawyer should obtain an affidavit of solvency 
from the prospective client confirming the facts surrounding any existing 
or potential liabilities.222 
In addition to obtaining a client’s signed affidavits and statements, 
proper due diligence dictates that the attorney should not rely on such 
representations alone but should verify the client’s financial records with 
third party sources. Recording Internet search records—or the absence 
thereof—helps to reinforce records produced by the client and referees. 
Attorneys should preserve records describing the facts of any case in 
which the lawyer declines to represent the potential client.223 
Attorneys may consider focusing on those client goals for which 
asset protection is an incidental benefit the better approach to modern 
asset protection planning. For example, a client without an estate plan 
may benefit from having a will and trust prepared.224 At the same time, 
the lawyer should ensure that the memoranda and file records prepared in 
the course of the representation demonstrate a genuine need for estate 
planning benefits. If a trust is put in place to minimize estate taxes, one 
should expect to see an estate the size of which would be subject to an 
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estate tax absent such planning, along with a file memorandum 
identifying the estate tax savings goals to be served through the plan. 
B. Alternatives to Gifting 
Asset protection trusts have the capacity to be the victims of their 
own success. Any time the creditor is told that no assets are available to 
satisfy a debt, it forces the creditor to find other ways to attack the asset 
protection structure and undermine the trust planning. If the Kilker 
decision is followed by other states, it is fair to say that asset protection 
trusts will have reached a tipping point, with creditors gaining the upper 
hand in both state and federal bankruptcy courts. 
While trusts have been used to sever legal and beneficial ownership 
for centuries, there are more modern vehicles for achieving many of the 
same benefits, such as planning structures that confer valuable asset 
protection benefits, including captive insurance,225 limited liability 
companies, and foreign investment funds. These modern alternatives to 
the common law trust primarily serve important business purposes while 
incidentally conferring asset protection benefits that rival or, in some 
cases, surpass those of an asset protection trust. More importantly, such 
structures owe their success to the arm’s length nature of transfers made 
into such structures, which are less gratuitous and suspect than transfers 
made in trust. 
1. Captive Insurance 
Captive insurance is a strategic planning alternative by which an 
insurance company assumes the property and casualty risks of a related 
business.226 Born out of the need to secure reinsurance for large steel 
mills, captive insurance exploded in popularity as insureds learned to 
manage their insurance claims and capture profits from underwriting 
their own business activities. In addition, captive insurance enables a 
business to obtain the full spectrum of coverage, including protection 
against cyberfraud, reputational risk, and business interruption that are 
not readily available in the commercial marketplace at reasonable rates, 
without excessive limitations or exclusions in coverage.227 
A central tenet of captive insurance planning is that premium 
payments made by the insured business to the captive insurance company 
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for insurance coverage must be at arm’s length.228 If the insured business 
manages its claims experience to minimize payouts, the profits 
accumulated inside the captive insurance company constitute a 
significant wealth transfer from the operating business to the captive 
insurance company.229 This is particularly useful if the operating business 
incurs higher than normal risks in its operations or accumulates 
significant cash. 
Captive insurance offers important asset protection benefits.230 First, 
when a business purchases insurance coverage from a captive, insurance 
premiums flow from the business to the captive to pay for that insurance 
coverage.  Those premium dollars are no longer in the business, where 
they might otherwise be exposed to creditor claims.  Instead, those 
premium dollars now belong to the captive.231 This can be analogized to 
severing legal and beneficial ownership in a trust setting: while legal 
ownership of funds used to pay premiums shift from the operating 
business to the captive, the beneficial ownership remains with the owner 
of the captive, who, most often, owns the operating business. 
When the captive insurance company is formed, consideration 
should be given to the ownership structure of the captive.  For example, 
if an individual becomes an owner of a captive, then that ownership 
interest is a personal asset of the individual.  By comparison, if that same 
individual created an asset protection trust to take on ownership of the 
captive, the individual’s creditors may have limited or no recourse 
against the assets of the trust.232  The funds accumulated inside the 
captive reflect earned income from underwriting activities, depriving 
creditors of the opportunity to pursue a gratuitous transfer from the 
business owner to the captive or its trust owner. 
Third, captive insurance companies are most often established 
offshore, although an increasing number are formed domestically.233 
Many offshore jurisdictions that are popular for captive insurance 
planning are also well-known asset protection jurisdictions, such as 
Belize and Nevis.234 A creditor pursuing premium payments made to a 
captive must prove that premium payments were not at arm’s length; the 
creditor must also accomplish this in a foreign legal setting with different 
rules, under an English “loser pays” rule for legal expenses, and with a 





232 See Wy. Stat. § 4-10-517 (1997). 
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bond requirement to gain access to the courthouse in many 
jurisdictions.235 
At the same time, asset protection benefits rarely drive the captive 
insurance market. Captive insurance is premised on the benefits that can 
be achieved by managing claims and conserving premium income that 
otherwise might be lost to a third-party carrier. These financial benefits 
are magnified if ownership of the operating business belongs to the older 
generation of family members and the captive belongs to the younger 
generation; properly structured, wealth may shift transfer tax free from 
one generation to the next.236 
The benefits of captive insurance may be compounded because of 
important tax savings realized in the operating business in the form of 
premium expense deductions, as well as the manner in which the captive 
insurance company recognizes income for tax purposes.237 Smaller 
captive insurance companies may even enjoy an exemption on up to $1.2 
million238 of premium income under current law.239 
Under Section 831(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, a small captive 
insurance company that collects no more than $1.2 million in premium 
may elect exemption from corporate income tax on insurance income.240 
Instead, the small captive is only taxed on its non-insurance income, such 
as dividends, capital gains, and interest income.241 These benefits must 
be balanced against the increased tax cost of investment income realized 
inside the captive, including capital gains, which do not enjoy a reduced 
rate of tax.242 
Captives are taxable as C corporations, which do not enjoy as many 
graduated tax brackets as individuals.243 Additionally, the owners of the 
captive incur corporate- and shareholder-lever taxation on the 
distribution of appreciated property, as well as a tax liability on cash 
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dividends.244 Finally, liquidating a captive may incur taxes for both the 
captive and its shareholders. While the tax savings of a captive may not 
be overwhelming, the after-tax profits captured through a successfully 
managed captive insurance company provide compelling non-asset 
protection reasons to implement a captive insurance company.245 
2. LLCs 
 In addition to captive insurance companies, asset protection 
planners widely utilize limited liability companies (“LLCs”) as an 
alternative to a traditional DAPT.246 The limited liability company is 
perhaps the most popular form of business entity in use today. LLCs are 
formed for the purpose of engaging in a wide variety of activities, from 
pursuing an active, operating business to pooling assets as part of a 
common investment strategy. 
First introduced in Wyoming in 1977,247 LLC statutes now exist in 
all fifty states and many foreign jurisdictions. Built upon important 
concepts from partnership, limited partnership, and corporate law, many 
states have taken significant steps to help ensure that LLCs have the best 
of everything that business entity law has to offer.248 
Asset protection benefits derive from the legal relationship between 
the LLC and its members.249 Members contribute to the capital of an 
LLC in exchange for the equivalent value in the form of a membership 
interest issued by the LLC.250 Capital and income inside the LLC are 
generally shielded from interference by an outside creditor, who may be 
limited in many jurisdictions to a charging order remedy against a 
debtor-member’s LLC interest.251 The charging order is akin to a wage 
garnishment, only entitling the creditor to receive distributions if and 
when made voluntarily by the LLC to its members.252 LLCs are viable 
and rather efficacious alternatives to asset protection trusts that erect 
firewalls against unanticipated future creditors. 
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3. Foreign Investment Funds   
One may consider foreign investment funds, as they offer a solid 
alternative to asset protection trusts.253  By pursuing an international 
investment opportunity not available in the client’s home jurisdiction, or 
where the debtor cannot directly participate, such as Regulation S 
offerings, a client may attain asset protection benefits while also 
experiencing financial benefits from the investment fund.254 
Many foreign investment funds prohibit transfers of ownership 
interests to third parties and limit redemption requests as to timing and 
amount.255 Creditors in the United States may be prohibited from gaining 
any interest in a fund that has offered interests under the Regulation S 
exemption.256 Many of the common forms of creditor limitations 
applicable to LLCs also apply to foreign investment funds, many of 
which are organized as LLCs: Creditors may be limited to a charging 
order against an investor’s interest, and creditors are normally denied the 
ability to demand redemptions or interfere with management of the 
investment fund.257 A combination of these factors may have the effect of 
reducing the perceived value of the investment interest in the eyes of the 
creditor. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Asset protection planning has become a hot topic at national legal 
conferences and occupies an entire industry of attorneys. Yet, case law 
over the years has enshrouded this important area of practice in a fog. 
Estate planning attorneys are simply incapable of giving complete legal 
advice to their clients without evaluating the need for asset protection. As 
more states enact DAPT laws, the risk of inconsistent consequences from 
asset protection planning and fraudulent transfers among states increases. 
Responsible social policy and sound legal principles require that 
attorneys and their clients be able to engage in asset protection planning, 
                                                                                                             
253 Stan Choes, More investors are saying ‘hola’ to foreign funds as US hedge, ALASKA 
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-
of-Commerce/October-Issue-3-2013/More-investors-are-saying-hola-to-foreign-funds-as-
US-hedge. 
254 Regulation S enables domestic and foreign issuing companies to raise capital by 
selling securities abroad. Such securities are excluded from SEC regulations under the 
Securities Act of 1933. 
255 See Investment Funds, Practical Law Company (2012), http://www.homburger.ch/fil
eadmin/ publications/ PLCIF2012.pdf. 
256 See 17 CFR 230.902(h) (no offer can be made to a person in the United States as 
part of any “offshore transaction”). 
257 Engel, supra note 8 at 801.01-801.06.  
174 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:135 
even if planning means that future unanticipated creditors may be denied 
access to client assets. At the same time, residents of non-DAPT states 
may be denied the same planning opportunities as residents of DAPT 
states. Attorneys engaged in asset protection planning in non-DAPT 
states should therefore explore the use of alternative planning techniques 
where asset protection is an incidental benefit rather than the primary 
planning objective served by the structure. 
